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Book Review
Workable Antitrust Remedies 
Richard A. Epstein 
Antitrust Consent Decrees in Theory and Practice: Why Less Is More 
AEI Press ▪ 2007 
Reviewed by Wil l iam H. Page
Just over twenty years ago, Frank Easterbrook proposed renaming the Chicago School of antitrust
analysis the “Workable Antitrust Policy School,” in recognition of its skepticism about “the ability
of courts to make things better even with the best data.”1 Richard Epstein’s brief study of consent
decrees2 is in this tradition of circumspection in antitrust matters. Epstein proposes to analyze “the
role consent decrees play in the antitrust law” by examining “the factual and legal disputes that
gave rise” to various decrees.3 He finds many decrees of the past century misguided in their ambi-
tion, but concludes, on the evidence of the 2002 Microsoft decree, that the Antitrust Division, for
the moment, has learned the virtues of minimalism—that less is more. His goal in the book is to
buttress this new approach against any future backsliding by providing “a better understanding
of why [the recent changes] count as improvements.”4
Epstein begins with a theoretical overview of the legal and practical characteristics of consent
decrees. He observes that, although a proposed decree is a negotiated settlement between
opposing parties in litigation, the Tunney Act5 now requires the court in which the government’s
case is pending to determine if the decree is in the public interest before entering it as a final judg-
ment. Measured by the modern understanding of the public interest, Epstein argues, many con-
sent decrees entered over the past century have been overly interventionist and administratively
complex. They have also remained in effect too long, in part because of the 1932 Swift decision,6
which required a showing of “grievous wrong” from changed circumstances before a court could
modify or terminate a decree. The lesson Epstein proposes to extract from this history is that con-
sent decrees should be as simple as possible, requiring minimal judicial supervision, and should
take account of “the strengths and weaknesses of antitrust law.”7
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1 Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1701 (1986). 
2 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: WHY LESS IS MORE (2007). 
3 Id. at 2. 
4 Id. at 3. 
5 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). Epstein rightly notes a critical “tension” in the Act’s framework: “[w]hile a district judge who is completely passive
has failed to discharge his responsibilities under the Tunney Act, a judge who takes over the case displaces (typically) the prosecutor, which
may, in turn, raise serious separation of powers issues.” EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 5. See generally Joseph G. Krauss, David J. Saylor &
Logan M. Breed, The Tunney Act: A House Still Standing, ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2007, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/06/
Jun07-Krauss6-20f.pdf. 
6 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 144 (1932). 
7 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 9. 
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Epstein briefly surveys traditional common law and equitable remedies in private litigation, dis-
cerning in them a judicial predisposition to “maximize the freedom of the parties after the impo-
sition of the remedy, and to minimize the judicial resources needed to keep those parties apart.”8
This approach reduces the need for costly ongoing supervision of the parties’ dealings. Although
antitrust decrees have broader external effects, they should, he reasons, adopt a similar
approach, one that is mainly focused on interdicting demonstrable violations. He maintains that
this approach will be relatively easy to implement in cartel cases, where the theory supporting
both liability and remedy is clear. In single-firm monopolization cases, however, the theory is less
conclusive and the remedial issues correspondingly more challenging. In these latter cases,
Epstein suggests, the benefits of “adventurous” decrees are likely to be lower and the costs of
administration far higher.9
Epstein then surveys the remedies entered in six cases over a span of half a century. In a brief
preliminary discussion, Epstein endorses the view that the litigation and remedies in Standard
Oil 10 and Alcoa11 accomplished little, because transformations in the market rendered the reme-
dies unnecessary by the time they were imposed; he notes that the vertical divestiture required
in Paramount 12 was ill-suited to the underlying cartel case.13 He examines the other three cases
more closely. He cogently critiques the Swift decree’s prohibitions on vertical integration, which
had little to do with the alleged horizontal restraints with which the meat packers were charged.
Still more convincingly, he attacks the Supreme Court’s insistence, many years after entry of the
decree, that these restrictions remain in effect, seemingly in order to protect firms in adjacent mar-
kets from the lower cost competition the defendants might bring if allowed to integrate. It was in
this decision that the Court announced that consent decrees could not be modified except to cor-
rect a grievous wrong.14
Epstein’s assessment of the ASCAP/BMI consent decrees is more favorable. ASCAP and BMI
are performing rights organizations that, among other functions, sell licenses to broadcasters 
and others to perform the songs in the organizations’ libraries. The 1941 consent decrees, Epstein
argues, sensibly acknowledged the organizations’ efficiency advantages.15 Nevertheless, the
decrees barred the organizations from including exclusivity provisions in their licenses and
required the organizations to offer “per program” licenses in addition to the standard blanket
licenses. The main difficulties in implementation of the decrees, according to Epstein, have
stemmed from disparities in the treatment of the two organizations under separate decrees and
from the complexities of determining the appropriate relationship between the prices of the pro-
gram and blanket licenses. Despite these ongoing problems, he concludes that the decrees
have remained appropriately “tied to the core violations to which they were directed”16 and have
not hindered the efficiency of the organizations. 
8 Id. at 13. 
9 Id. at 14–17. 
10 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
11 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
12 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
13 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 18–21. 
14 Id. at 22–29. 
15 Id. at 34. 
16 Id. at 39. 
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Epstein next turns his attention to the decades-long United Shoe Machinery litigation, which
focused on the exclusionary effects of United’s long-term leases. This choice of subject is some-
what confusing because none of the many lawsuits the government brought against United ended
in a consent decree. Perhaps anticipating this objection, Epstein suggests earlier in the book that
consent decrees “operate as a close substitute for final judgments, from which they should not be
distinguished analytically.”17 Certainly, both consent decrees and judgments in litigated cases are
final judgments with similar legal effects. But the very title of Epstein’s book assumes that the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of consent decrees are sufficiently important to justify a separate
study; otherwise, there would be no reason not to extend the scope of the study to countless other
final judgments in government antitrust litigation. 
Epstein seems to have included United Shoe Machinery in his study because of its connections
to Swift. He largely endorses the early government actions challenging United’s exclusive long-
term leases as well as the relatively focused remedial orders that followed.18 He is far more criti-
cal of the renewed action that led to Judge Wyzanski’s famous 1953 decision holding that United
had monopolized the shoe machinery market by similar leasing practices.19 Judge Wyzanski lim-
ited the remedy in that case to conduct orders, sensibly rejecting the government’s proposal to
break up United, which had a single production facility. In doing so, he famously observed that “it
takes no Solomon to see that this organism cannot be cut into three equal and viable parts.”20
Nevertheless, Epstein criticizes Judge Wyzanski’s remedial orders for making the same mistake
as the Swift decree by imposing strictures with little connection to the liability rulings.21 For exam-
ple, Wyzanski capped the length of United’s equipment leases at five years, even though both par-
ties to the transaction may have preferred a longer term. He also required United to give its cus-
tomers the option to buy its machines at “reasonable” prices, subject to his review. When these
and other provisions failed to reduce United’s market share sufficiently after ten years, the gov-
ernment applied for still more onerous relief, which Wyzanski rejected under Swift ’s “grievous
wrong” standard. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, instructing the district court that the
Swift standard did not apply to efforts by the government to secure the “complete extirpation of
the illegal monopoly.”22 Epstein describes the “macabre”23 denouement: United was forced to
divest some of its assets, and then declined steadily until it was finally sold to a foreign firm. 
Epstein devotes a full chapter to the 1982 AT&T settlement that produced the consent decree
known as the “modified final judgment,” or MFJ.24 He first recounts the history and rationale of the
decree.25 AT&T encompassed the Bell System, a network of regulated monopolies of local and
long-distance telephony. When technological changes allowed entry into the long-distance mar-
ket, AT&T was able to use its control over the local exchange to disadvantage its long-distance
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17 Id. at 5. 
18 Id. at 43–44. 
19 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). 
20 Id. at 348. 
21 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 48. 
22 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 251 (1968). 
23 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 171 (1978). 
24 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 226–34 (D.D.C. 1982). For an interesting account of the background and negotiations leading to
the settlement, see STEPHEN COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T (1986). 
25 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 54–58. 
rivals, like MCI. The consent decree separated the local exchanges from AT&T and grouped them
into “regional Bell operating companies,” or RBOCs, which were subject to quarantines barring
them from entering the long-distance market. AT&T itself was allowed to compete with MCI and
others in long-distance services. The breakup/quarantine framework was the brainchild of William
Baxter, the Chicago-oriented Stanford law professor who then headed the Antitrust Division.
Baxter believed that a regulated local exchange monopoly, if allowed to integrate into competitive
markets, would always have an incentive to use its unexploited monopoly power to disadvantage
its rivals, and regulators like the FCC would be unable to control the monopolist’s depredations. 
Epstein’s Chicago colleague, Richard Posner, has characterized the MFJ as arguably “the most
successful antitrust structural remedy in history.”26 Epstein’s assessment is decidedly more neg-
ative. Despite the worthy efforts of Baxter and Judge Harold Greene, who oversaw enforcement
of the MFJ for twelve years, Epstein argues that “the decree suffered from an excess of ambition
and from a lack of focus and finitude. [Greene] could not control the unruly set of forces his divesti-
ture set in motion.”27 Epstein suggests that neither Baxter nor Judge Greene recognized that com-
petition was not possible in telephony because of the need to mandate and regulate intercon-
nection among many firms of widely differing sizes. Consequently, the decree failed adequately
to account for the enormous transaction costs in multi-tiered regulation that the breakup and sub-
sequent enforcement would entail. It was overly optimistic, according to Epstein, to think that the
breakup, by removing the local exchange companies’ incentive to discriminate in favor of AT&T,
would drastically simplify the FCC’s task in regulating the terms of interconnection. Epstein also
takes Judge Greene to task for invoking populist nostrums in support of the breakup alternative. 
The appropriate response to AT&T’s illegal actions, Epstein argues, “would have been to facil-
itate new competition at the edges of the Bell System by outlawing discrete, identified contractu-
al provisions and business practices, analogous to the limitation on exclusive-dealing provisions
in the early stages of United Shoe Machinery.”28 Instead, the government, with the court’s
approval, pressed on for a breakup. As a consequence, “Judge Greene operated a de facto
administrative agency to respond to a wide range of disputes.”29 Epstein canvasses a series of
complex disputes Judge Greene was forced to resolve until the 1996 Telecommunications Act dis-
placed the MFJ with a system of explicitly regulatory obligations. 
The final case study of the volume examines the Microsoft government litigation. Epstein dis-
closes in an acknowledgments page that Microsoft provided “financial support” for the book,
although it “did not review or oversee [the book’s] conclusions.”30 Epstein’s conclusions with
respect to the Microsoft litigation certainly do not reproduce Microsoft’s litigating positions. The
most surprising aspect of this portion of the book, given Epstein’s analytical framework, is its
almost complete endorsement of the outcome in the government case. 
Epstein begins the chapter inauspiciously by suggesting that the government’s lawsuit should
be treated “like a common carrier case” aimed at requiring Microsoft to “supply services to all
comers on (1) reasonable and (2) nondiscriminatory terms.”31 Even though Epstein qualifies this
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26 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 111 (2d ed. 2001). 
27 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 58. 
28 Id. at 65. 
29 Id. at 68. 
30 Id. at xi. 
31 Id. at 74. 
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statement by noting, first, that the case was not about setting reasonable prices and, second, that
Microsoft operates in a two-sided market (marketing its operating system both to users and soft-
ware developers), the common carrier analogy does not illuminate Microsoft. 
More fruitfully, Epstein examines in some detail the 1994 consent decree that ended the
Antitrust Division’s first Microsoft investigation, and describes how that decree’s anti-tying provi-
sion led to the 1997 contempt action and, ultimately, to the famous 1998 Sherman Act case chal-
lenging Microsoft’s competitive responses to Netscape’s Web browser and Sun’s Java technolo-
gies.32 Epstein briefly describes the district court and D.C. Circuit analyses, in the consent decree
case, of whether Microsoft’s Windows and operating system and its Internet Explorer browser were
“integrated.” He then recounts the government’s theory in the 1998 case that Navigator and Java
posed a “middleware threat” to Microsoft’s Windows monopoly (because they might have evolved
into a rival platform that would allow developers to write applications that would run on all oper-
ating systems) and that Microsoft sought to stave off the threat by a combination of contractual
and design measures aimed at limiting its nascent rivals’ usage share. His brief account of the
D.C. Circuit’s eventual resolution of these contentions is accurate, though remarkably uncritical.33
The heart of the chapter is a discussion of remedies in the 1998 case. Epstein rightly criticizes
Judge Jackson’s initial breakup order as both unresponsive to the liability findings and extraordi-
narily costly on many counts. (Epstein suggests that the order reflected a failure to grasp the hard
lessons of the AT&T experience, but its shortcomings went far beyond those of the MFJ.) Epstein
also considers the possibility, in principle, of a fine or damage remedy in the case, but suggests
any such award would have posed an unacceptable risk of overdeterrence, because it would be
impossible to disentangle the competitive effects of Microsoft’s benign and malign conduct. This
is a fair point, although it is worth mentioning that these difficulties did not prevent Microsoft’s rivals
and customers from suing and obtaining settlements totaling well into the billions of dollars.34
Epstein endorses the consent decree in the government case, Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s approval
of the decree, and the D.C. Circuit’s affirmance. Consistent with the thesis of the book, he partic-
ularly approves the focus of the decree on enjoining acts specifically held unlawful by the D.C.
Circuit.35 The decree, for example, prohibits retaliation against firms that deal with Microsoft’s
rivals, and requires Microsoft to license Windows to computer manufacturers on nondiscrimina-
tory terms,36 while giving the manufacturers flexibility in configuring the Windows desktop and
boot sequence. 
Interestingly, Epstein even approves the provision of the decree that requires Microsoft to
license communications protocols that allow Windows client computers to interoperate with
Windows server operating systems.37 This provision, according to Epstein, “only addresses the
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32 Id. at 76–84. 
33 For a more critical discussion, see WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND
CONSUMER WELFARE chs. 4 & 5 (2007). 
34 Id. at 237–42. 
35 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 96–100. 
36 The nondiscrimination section includes a proviso that allows Microsoft to offer market development allowances. Epstein cautions that 
“this provision is not easy to interpret or enforce, and even with the exceptions, may block Microsoft from responding to market conditions.
. . . This section will be anticompetitive if read to exclude that option.” Id. at 97–98. 
37 Final Judgment § III.E, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f200400/200457.htm. 
most important obstacle to open competition, namely, the inability to hook up on equal terms to
Microsoft’s operating system.”38 It is true that this provision was designed to give software devel-
opers writing programs for non-Microsoft servers the means to interoperate with Windows as well
as programs running on Microsoft servers.39 The difficulty with Epstein’s assessment is that the
provision violates the core principle that Epstein is advancing in his book: that courts should
reserve injunctive relief in antitrust cases for interdiction of unlawful actions. As Judge Kollar-
Kotelly40 and the court of appeals41 recognized, this provision is not responsive to any proven vio-
lations; indeed the government’s case had almost nothing to do with communications protocols
or with server operating systems. The provision was explicitly designed to be “forward-looking,”42
to preserve the possibility that middleware threats could develop in network computing or the
Internet at some point in the future.43 Although well-intentioned, the provision has proven extreme-
ly difficult and costly to implement and has attracted only a few licensees, none of which poses
any sort of middleware threat.44
Epstein is correct, however, that the protocol licensing provision of the U.S. final judgment is
preferable to its counterpart in the European Microsoft case. Unlike the U.S. licensing requirement,
which is limited to firms legitimately seeking to improve interoperability with Windows, the
European order requires Microsoft to license its “interoperability information” to “any undertaking
having an interest in developing and distributing work group server operating system products,”45
for any purpose related to developing those products. This broader scope unmoors the require-
ment from any appropriate antitrust purpose. 
Epstein also defends the approach of the Microsoft consent decree against Herbert
Hovenkamp’s critique in his recent book, The Antitrust Enterprise.46 Hovenkamp characterizes the
Microsoft remedy as “too little, too late”47 because, among other things, it fails to address all of
Microsoft’s illegal conduct, particularly “commingling” browser and operating system code.48
Epstein, however, endorses Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s reasoning in rejecting any code-removal
requirement: requiring Microsoft to permit computer manufacturers and end users to remove the
visible means of access to the browser was sufficient to address the anticompetitive conse-
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38 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 98. 
39 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 189–90 (D.D.C. 2002). 
40 Id. at 190 (recognizing that “this aspect of the remedy plainly exceeds the scope of liability”). 
41 Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (recognizing “the difficulties inherent in crafting a forward-looking
provision concerning a type of business conduct as to which there has not been a violation of the law”). 
42 Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 190. 
43 Id. at 192 (reasoning that “given the rapid pace of change in the software industry,” without the provision, “it is quite possible that the core
of the decree would prove prematurely obsolete”).
44 See generally William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the
Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). The working paper
version of this article is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=978815. 
45 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Commission Decision of 24 Mar 2004, Art. 5(a), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf. 
46 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 297–302 (2006). 
47 Id. at 300. 
48 Id. at 298–99. 
quences of integrating the browser and the operating system. Moreover, code removal would have
harmed consumers by undermining the integrity of Microsoft’s platform.49
Hovenkamp also argues that the success of the decree should be judged, not by whether
Microsoft had complied with its terms, but by whether the the market has actually become “work-
ably competitive.”50 Epstein responds that the decree will be successful if it removes illegal
impediments to competition. The government never proved that Microsoft’s illegal actions pre-
vented the emergence of a significant rival platform; Microsoft’s benign and neutral actions in a
market characterized by network effects could well have produced the same result. Thus, it would
be inappropriate to mandate an “ideal distribution of market shares” as an antitrust remedy.51 As
the experience of United Shoe Machinery and AT&T shows, Epstein argues, a “more draconian”52
decree would likely have been counterproductive. 
In a brief concluding chapter, Epstein summarizes the lessons of his study. First, firms should
abandon contractual exclusionary terms and rely on their products’ characteristics for their mar-
ket success. Second, decrees should be limited to interdicting illegal actions. Third, antitrust relief
should not be superimposed on an existing regulatory structure that addresses the same monop-
olistic practices. Fourth, antitrust remedies should be limited in duration, and rely more on inno-
vation and entry than government mandates in restoring competition. Finally, in antitrust remedies,
“it is always more expensive [in transaction costs and in hindering competition] to do more than
it is to do less.”53
Epstein’s study is an interesting and idiosyncratic analysis of antitrust remedies—primarily,
though not exclusively, consent decrees—in government enforcement actions at various stages
of antitrust history. In his analysis, he is suspicious of antitrust enforcement generally, but not to
the point of denying that some single-firm conduct can be sufficiently anticompetitive to warrant
government intervention. Where intervention occurs, however, he argues that it should be limited
to enjoining the demonstrably anticompetitive conduct because government lacks the wisdom
and administrative competence to achieve the positive goal of creating competitive conditions.
Epstein is right that U.S. enforcement officials, at the federal level, have largely accepted these
principles. Nevertheless, the book will be valuable, both for the fine texture of its analyses and
observations, and as a cautionary tale for antitrust enforcers worldwide.
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49 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 104–05. 
50 HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 300. 
51 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 104–05. 
52 Id. at 105.
53 Id. at 115. 
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